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Introduction
On July 9th, 1816 Argentina declared independence from Spain. Following a bloody
revolution, and an additional thirty-seven years of civil war, a constitution was officially
adopted in 1853. This marks the beginning of the ‘modern’ Argentine state. During the period
between 1853 and 1900 Argentina experienced unparalleled growth. Mass European
immigration, foreign investment by the British, and agricultural exports allowed Argentina
“three decades of growth averaging 5% a year.”1 Between 1860 and 1930 “Argentina outgrew
[the United States, Canada, Australia, and Brazil] in population, total income, and per capita
income.”2 In 1913 Argentina “was among the 10 richest economies in the world.”3
This early economic success is often attributed to three things. The first is the relative
political stability between the 1860s and 1930. Prior to 1930 Argentina experienced “seven
decades of civilian constitutional government.”4 While there was some civil disturbances, most
notably the failed secession of Buenos Aires in the 1880s, the civilian government retained its
power and constitutionality. The second is the comparative agricultural advantage of Argentina.
The Pampas are highly fertile South American lowlands covering almost 300,000 square miles.
This land (which is primarily contained within the national boundaries of Argentina) was heavily
exploited by the land owning elite. European immigrants would often come to Argentina as

1

"Becoming a serious country." The Economist. June 05, 2004.
Mundlak, Yair, Domingo Cavallo, and Roberto Domenech. Agriculture and economic growth in Argentina, 191384. Vol. 76. Intl Food Policy Res Inst, 1989. Pg. 12
3
Beattie, Alan. "Argentina: The superpower that never was." The Financial Times. May 22, 2009.
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"Becoming a serious country." The Economist.
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tenant farmers, working the lands before making their way to Buenos Aires. Finally, as a result
of political stability, favorable government policies, and a mass of investment opportunities,
foreign investment was incredibly high until it was hampered by World War 1 and the Great
Depression. “Argentina is thus not a “developing country”. Uniquely, it achieved development
and then lost it again.”5
This regression – from developed to developing nation – is commonly known as the
‘Argentine Paradox’. How could a country so promising and rich go through such a terrible
economic backslide? Scholars have posited a number of explanations. One, put forward by Raul
Prebisch, argues that over time the value of primary commodities6 on the world market would
decrease in relation to the price of manufactured goods. This long term shift in prices effects
the terms of trade, and disproportionately harms the countries which produce primary
commodities. This forms the economic basis of what is called dependency theory. In terms of
attempting to answer the Argentine paradox, dependency theory shows how Argentina could
have amassed a large amount of wealth near at the beginning of the 20 th century (when the
terms of trade benefited primary commodity producers), and that this initial advantage was
eventually whittled away by changes in global trading patterns.
Another argues that socio-political instability is bad for economic development and
growth. Instability, in the form of constant regime changes is bad for development. With
different regimes come different (and often opposing) economic models, which impairs long

5

“Becoming a Serious Country”. The Economist
Food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, excluding manufactured goods; crude materials, inedible,
excluding fuels, synthetic fibres, waste and scrap; mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, excluding
petroleum products; animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. – From the OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms
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term economic planning that is necessary to transition an economy from a pre-industrial
agricultural economy into a technologically advanced industrial and postindustrial economy.
Instability is also directly related to consumer, producer, and investor confidence. Rapid
political change, especially violent political change, can upset the functioning of an economy. It
makes for a bad investment climate, and is marked by perpetual anxiety over future social,
economic, and political conditions. Starting in 1930, and continuing over the course of the next
five decades, Argentina experienced six military coups. This would correspond to 347 different
heads of state between 1930 and 1983. The average term length for these rulers is under 1.55
years8. The argument goes that Argentina’s pre-1930 stability allowed for unprecedented
economic growth, and that Argentina’s post-1930 instability increased economic volatility,
leading to a number of crises, which would see this wealth eroded and Argentina returned to
‘developing’ status.
These arguments have to do with broader trends, but many arguments are rooted in
specific policies pursued by various Argentinian regimes. The government which often receives
the most criticism is the regime of Juan Domingo Perón. For anti-Peronists, his nationalization
project, push for labor empowerment, and creation of a welfare state are all to blame for
Argentina’s failure. If only Peron had freed the markets, then Argentina would have continued
to develop as a world economic power. Conversely, pro-Peronist scholars argue that the pursuit
of market liberalization, free trade, and labor suppression – pursued in the decades following
Perón’s ouster – ruined the Argentine economy. This paper will focus in on this issue.

7
8

Counting Juan Domingo Peron twice (based on his two separate presidencies).
When Peron’s first presidency is removed as an outlier this number falls to 1.3 years.
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The theoretical question of this paper is trying to find an explanation to the Argentine
paradox. Practically, I will attempt to answer this question by addressing another one – Is Perón
to blame for Argentina’s regression? By reframing the question this way I hope to better
address the contextual issues surrounding the Argentina paradox, and to dispel some of the
myths surrounding early Peronism. The ultimate aims of this paper are to: 1) present a
comprehensive analysis of the Peronist model and 2) analyze the long-term effects of this
model on the development of Argentina. I will attempt to do this in three chapters. First, a
chapter on the economic history of Argentina leading up to the beginning of the first Peronist
presidency. Second, a chapter on Peron’s developmental model. This chapter will look to
examine the distinct features of the Peronist model, and address some common criticisms of
the model. Third, a chapter comparing the Peronist model with the ‘Asian miracle’ model of
development, comparing features and looking to explain why the Peronist model was
ultimately unsuccessful in achieving development, even though it shared many policies with the
successful Asian miracle model. Finally, a concluding section will attempt to tie the key findings
of the paper into a coherent argument regarding the Peronist model and the Argentine
Paradox.
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Chapter 1 – The Historical Background: The End of the 19th Century to
the Rise of Peron
The historical method of analysis begins with a belief that the current period is built
upon events in the past; or in other terms, the complete denial of spontaneous generation. For
this reason the first challenge of any historical analysis is deciding when exactly to begin.
Picking any point in relevant history as the starting point necessarily means you will leave out –
to varying degrees – what came before that point. The author must decide when to begin, and
to attempt to provide a summary of what led to that origin point. This paper’s focus is on the
Argentine Paradox, and specifically the contributions of the Peronist economic regime to the
paradox. For that reason I have decided to begin my historical analysis prior to the beginning of
the 20th century, in 1880, when Argentina began experiencing its incredible growth that would
make it one of the richest countries in the world by 1900. This year corresponds to the
federalization of Buenos Aires, when the city which would become the ‘Paris of South America’
became the capital of the nation. This chapter will provide the historical framework by which
we will begin to analyze the Argentine paradox, and the role of the Peronist regime. In it I will
explore the natural, economic, and political history of Argentina leading up to the election of
Juan Domingo Peron to the Presidency in 1946.
Even to begin in 1880, requires a brief comment on the earliest parts of independent
Argentina’s history. Argentina declared independence in July of 1816 from Spain. At that time
“a little under half a million people inhabited what is now Argentina—some three percent
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Indians, about 20,000 blacks, 60,000 mulattos, over 100,000 mestizos, and perhaps 10,000
individuals of European descent.”9 By the turn of the century Argentina would be
predominantly white, due in no small part to European immigration. Following the war for
independence Argentina was thrust into a civil war over the administrative structure of the
nation. The Constitution was written in 1853, and caused Buenos Aires to initially secede and
become an independent state. A military campaign led by Justo Jose de Urquiza resulted in the
forced reincorporation of the city in 1859. Then in 1861 Bartolome Mitre overthrew Urquiza
and became the first democratically elected President in Argentina’s history. The Presidency
would then peacefully transition five different times, eventually resulting in the election of Julio
Argentino Roca in 1880, where the focus of this paper really begins.

Subsection 1 – 1880 to World War One: Argentina’s Golden Age
Luis Alberto Romero, an Argentine historian, writes that “after 1880, a new institutional
framework was created,”10 which was fundamentally a “monarchy dressed as a republic.”11 This
Argentina was characterized by its “strong presidential power, exercised without limits in the
vast national territories,” but which was subject to “the checks and balances exercised by the
congress, above all the prohibition of presidential reelection, [ensuring] that executive power
could not become tyrannical.”12 At the time the only recognized political party was the Partido
Autonomista Nacional (PAN) which would effectively rule Argentina uncontested from 1874 to

9

MacLachlan, Colin M. Argentina: What went wrong. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. Pg. 1
R Romero, Luis Alberto. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century: Updated and Revised Edition. Penn
State Press, 2013. Pg. 3
11
Ibid. Pg. 3
12
Ibid. Pg. 4
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1916. During that period “Argentina [would grow] spectacularly and become wealthy.” 13 This
growth can be attributed to an infrastructure modernization project which was funded by
massive foreign (British) investment.
From 1880 to 1913 “British capital in Argentina increased twentyfold.”14 This investment
took a number of forms. Romero writes;
To the traditional British areas of investment such as trade, banking, and public loans
were added mortgage loans for land, investment in utilities such as gas, and investment
in transport such as streetcars and especially railroads. These investments proved
enormously profitable. In some cases such as the railroads, the government guaranteed
profits and also granted tax exemptions and land alongside the tracks to be laid.15
British railroad investment was key in transporting agricultural goods from the country side into
the port of Buenos Aires where it could be exported. In 1880 there was 2,500 kilometers (km)
of railroad track which, by 1916, would expand to 34,000 km of track. This initial investment
would bring the Argentine railroad within 6,000 km of its eventual peak at 40,000 km16. These
railroads not only connected Argentina with itself, allowing for effective governance by the PAN
from Buenos Aires, but it also connected Argentina with her South American neighbors.
MacLachlan writes
By 1912 rail connections to Paraguay and Bolivia had been completed. Mendoza
connected with a line (since abandoned) on the Chilean side that provided
transportation to Santiago and Chile’s Pacific port of Valparaiso. Railways bypassed
settlements that offered only marginal economic possibilities while turning others into
prosperous collection centers tied into the Atlantic export chain.17

13

Ibid. Pg. 2
Romero Pg. 5
15
Ibid. Pg. 5
16
Ibid. Pg. 5
17
MacLachlan Pg. 24
14
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This infrastructure project would coincide with investment in an extensive communication
(telegraph) network. By 1910 there would be 31,251 miles of telegraph cable.18 This
communication network allowed for a greater level of interconnectedness within Argentina,
planting the seeds for a growing nationalism which would further develop in the 20 th century,
and a greater connection to European markets. At the beginning of this project “cable
communication to Europe required five hours or more; [but] by 1911 it took a mere 45
minutes.”19
This foreign capital investment allowed for the simultaneous development of
Argentina’s agricultural and industrial economies. As mentioned before, Argentina successfully
pursued an export led growth model during the pre-World War One era. This was made
possible through a combination of natural and political forces. The highly fertile Pampas
wetlands provided an excellent environment for agricultural growth. While the Argentine
interior had been relatively inaccessible to the Argentine state until the 1870s, this would
dramatically change under the PAN administration.
The state undertook the so-called Conquest of the Desert, which resulted in the
incorporation of vast expanses of land suitable for cultivation, in which great plots at
minimum cost were transferred to powerful private interests and the well connected.
Many of these were already or would become landowners, and this policy was a
decisive turning point in the consolidation of the landowning class.20

18

Ibid. Pg. 25
MacLachlan Pg. 25
20
Romero Pg. 7
19
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The PAN administration was made up primarily of those within the landowning class, and thus
often acted in their interest. This is apparent in creation of massive estancias, comparable to
Mexican haciendas or North American plantation-estates. MacLachlan reports
San Jacinto, one of the nation’s largest estancias, comprised 244 square miles... [which]
supported 100,000 Durham cattle, 100,000 sheep and 10,000 horses. The estancia San
Juan…covered 40 square miles of carefully tended meadows. Most estancias mixed
animal breeding with supplying animals for the market and grain crops. The San Martín
occupied some 30 square miles…[While] to the south companies owned much of the
land. The Patagonian Sheep and Farming Company covered some 734 square miles.
Another estancia of 1,060 square miles belonged to the Bank of Antwerp.21
These massive estates were developed by their landlords and “with its base in agriculture, an
entrepreneurial class took shape…an oligarchy that controlled a vast array of businesses from
the halls of power.”22 These Argentine oligarchs valued market flexibility over outright
specialization. Aware of international market volatility these landowners adopted an adaptive
agricultural strategy which was capable of changing based on the most profitable goods
markets at any given time.
In the littoral, where cattle were scarce and produce could move by river, landowners
leaned toward agriculture; where the land was cheap, they opted for colonization,
which brought land under cultivation; once the land increased in value, they preferred a
sharecropping system. In the province of Buenos Aires, great landed estates and wool
production predominated, until the establishment of meatpacking plants made the
breeding of English blooded cattle stock for export profitable.23
Regardless of the product – be it sugar, wool, corn, beef, wheat, or linseed – Argentina’s
agricultural products enjoyed unparalleled growth from 1880 to 1916. Romero writes
Between 1892 and 1913, the production of wheat increased fivefold, half of which was
exported. During this same period, total exports also increased five times, and imports
grew at a slightly slower rate. To wheat were added corn and linseed, the three of which
21

MacLachlan Pg. 41
Romero Pg. 8
23
Ibid. Pg. 7
22
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were half of the country’s exports. Among the rest, besides wool, meat exports began to
occupy an increasing importance, especially after 1900, when packinghouses began to
export chilled and canned beef to Great Britain.24
This massive rural industry fed back into Argentina’s urban economy, developing an early
industrial economy within Buenos Aires. Food processing and textiles represent the core urban
industrial activities. “This industrial economy grew in consonance with the agrarian one,
expanding or contracting according to the rhythm of the latter.”25 By 1916 Argentina had
twenty-four million hectares of cultivated land.26 In addition the port of Buenos Aires became
the most important trading post in the nation. “The port accommodated 1,400 ships…[and] In
1908, 84 percent of imports and over half of the country’s exports passed through the port of
Buenos Aires.”27
While foreign investment funded these economies, and the state administered them,
they still needed workers to work within them. To do this the PAN government engaged in a
widely successful immigration campaign. From 1870 to the beginning of World War One,
Argentina’s population grew by six million people.28 Pro-immigration strategies included
circulating pro-Argentine propaganda in Europe, paying travel fares for immigrants29, and
forcing “steamship companies to raise return fares to Europe by 100 percent to slow the
number of returnees.”30 Mendoza, a metro area near the Andes, had “a population of 56,000,
over a third of them immigrants.”31 These migrants, primarily from Italy and Spain, ended up as

24

Ibid. Pg. 8
Romero Pg. 9
26
Ibid. Pg. 18
27
MacLachlan Pg. 24
28
Romero Pg. 10
29
Ibid. Pg. 6
30
MacLachlan Pg. 31
31
Ibid. Pg. 30
25

Gansley-Ortiz 11

sharecroppers and factory workers. “In 1914 foreigners made up only 4.4 percent of rural
landowners, concentrated mostly in specialty agriculture such as vineyards (62 percent).” 32
Immigrants would make up a large number of low skilled and low paying jobs within Argentina.
These jobs were notoriously dangerous;
Dust, chemical fumes, stench, and dangerous solvents assaulted the health of workers.
Packinghouse floors covered with blood, entrails, and excrement made for ghastly work.
Men who carried meat to the freezers covered their faces and hands with rags or old
newspapers so that the fresh blood would not freeze on their bodies. Rheumatism
disabled many packinghouse workers within five years.33
Over a four year span in Buenos Aires (1908 – 1912) nearly 500 workers died on the job.
Employers could not be held accountable for these workplace accidents until 1915. With
growing urbanization, in response to the booming economy, city living conditions deteriorated
dramatically. For instance “in Córdoba, municipal officials counted 2,041 rooms housing 6,494
individuals, without sanitary facilities or adequate ventilation.”34 These brutal conditions of
early industrial capitalism resulted in the birth of Argentina’s first unions.
The birth of Argentina’s first labor movements truly begins in 1900. Twenty years into
Argentina’s golden age, the literate population had significantly increased. The results of Hacer
la America – Argentina’s ‘American Dream’ – was a generation of Argentines who could attend
university. Here they were introduced to the ideas of Marx and romantic notions of
nationalism. This new intelligentsia would provide the philosophical basis for the growing
political dissent within Argentina. Abhorrent urban conditions and a lack of economic and
political rights for the lower and middle class led to increased criticism of the established order.

32

Ibid. Pg. 31
MacLachlan Pg. 44
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Ibid. Pg. 45
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In Santa Fe arrendatarios (sharecroppers) and chacareros (small farmers), began forming
cooperative organizations based on common goals. The first union agricultural union, the
Federacion Agraria Argentina, was formed in 1912 after mass strikes against the major
estancias. Likewise in the major cities “popular society started to coalesce [around] mutual aid
and resistance societies and trade unions.”35 Anarchist and socialist philosophies spread
throughout the nation, and in 1907 “150,000 workers participated in a general strike. Two years
later some 200,000 workers walked out to protest police violence. The government used 5,000
troops, heavily armed police, and mass arrests to break the strike.”36 Eventually, pressure from
(essentially) underground political parties and worker mobs proved to be too great for the PAN
administration. In 1912 they were forced to introduce universal male suffrage. In the very next
Presidential election, in 1916, the Partido Autonomista Nacional was defeated for the very first
time. The Union Civica Radical (UCR) led by Hipolito Yrigoyen would ascend to power. For some
“Yrigoyen’s assumption of power [was considered], without greatly exaggerating, the happy
culmination of the long process of modernization that had begun in the middle of the
nineteenth century.”37

Subsection 2 – The Radical ‘20s, the Infamous ‘30s, and the Rise of Juan Domingo Peron
The UCR platform as espoused by Hipolito Yrigoyen was focused largely on the
integration of the ‘average’ Argentine into national politics. Yrigoyen’s election under universal
male suffrage is evidence that his political and social rhetoric was popular with many

35

Romero Pg. 20
MacLachlan Pg. 48
37
Romero Pg. 2
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Argentines. It is important to note that only citizens could vote and, as mentioned before, a
number of immigrants to the country choose not to acquire citizenship. This placed Yrigoyen
firmly within growing nationalist sentiments; “Yrigoyen joined those who – distancing
themselves from the reigning cosmopolitanism – found Latin American identity in the common
Hispanic roots.”38 As a result of the United States ever increasing role in American politics
“support for a militant Latin American unity against the Yankee aggressor was strengthened by
the Mexican Revolution.”39 Yrigoyen attached himself to the middle class – leaving much of the
working class votes to be swept up by the weaker Socialist Party. According to Carl Solberg
“[Yrigoyen] appealed to the masses to support the "cause” of which he was the "apostle" and
which would defeat the allegedly wicked oligarchic "regime," in power before 1916, and then
lead the republic into an era of ethical righteousness”40
During the UCR presidencies, Argentina continued to experience export led growth. “In
1929 Argentina was still the world's largest exporter of chilled beef, maize, linseed and oats,
and the third largest exporter of wheat and flour.”41 However, growth had begun to slow down
in comparison to pre-war levels. “During the whole 40-year period before 1910—14 gross
domestic product at factor cost increased at an annual average of 6.3 percent. Between 19101914 and 1925-30 the rate fell to 3.5 per cent.”42 Argentina experienced two complete business
cycles (bust, boom, bust, and boom) in the sixteen years leading up to 1929.

38

Ibid. Pg. 29
Romero Pg. 29
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Solberg, Carl. "The Tariff and Politics in Argentina 1916-1930." The Hispanic American Historical Review 53, no. 2
(1973): 260-284. Pg. 263
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This common man rhetoric can be seen throughout the Yrigoyen presidency through
specific policy actions taken by the government. UCR party literature described their platform
like so;
Radical Bread, Radical Milk, Radical Meat, Radical Seed, and the Radical Homestead well
demonstrate that the party desires a moderate form of state intervention to alleviate
the rigours of economic laissez-faire on behalf of the poor, and for those disarmed in
the struggle for survival; an intervention which the English fittingly term paternalism. . .
It is time that a political party, organized throughout the country, should work towards
these ends and carry them out efficiently.43
The Radical Party attempted to position itself as a middle way ideology, focused on the
improvement of Argentina by elevating the country’s growing middle class. The UCR targeted
this particular bloc because it represented the largest eligible voting bloc in Buenos Aires (the
seat of Government). During the Radical years – 1916-1930 – Buenos Aires “was divided into
two groups, the natives and the foreigners, which …was almost the equivalent of saying the
voters and the non-voters.”44 The Socialist Party, which at the time was the only real alternative
to the UCR and the PAN, closely identified with urban workers and specifically immigrants. This
failed to translate into votes, due in no small part to immigrant unwillingness to apply for
Argentine citizenship. The UCR emphasized nationalism as a key foundation towards building
social and economic institutions. This would result in serious tension with immigrants who were
predominantly working class.
The urban working class found little in common with the middle class. They resented the
economic privileges of factory owners, landholders, and exporters, as well as the Radical
party’s patronage of the middle class. Strikes became more disruptive as industry
attempted to deal with material shortages caused by World War I. The war disrupted
coal imports from England, forcing industry to operate at reduced levels. Railway
43

Rock Rock, David. "Machine Politics in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Radical Party, 1912–1930." Journal of
Latin American Studies 4, no. 2 (1972): Pg. 245
44
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companies struggled to maintain schedules while imports plunged. Real wages fell
between 1914 and 1917 by a third as shortages forced industries to dismiss workers. 45
This tension would result in a number of clashes between the UCR government and the working
class between 1917 and 1924.
While the Radicals had achieved success at the polls, the Anarchists, Socialists, and
Unions were experiencing a great deal of popular support, this is shown by the surge in union
creation and membership during this period. Big transport unions the Federacion Obrera
Maritima (the Maritime Workers Union) and the Federacion Obrera Ferrocarrilera (the Railroad
Workers Union) were able to garner significant support. Their command over transport, a key
aspect of Argentina’s export economy, made them a significant force because they could easily
shutdown the economy in the event of a mass strike. These two unions in particular were made
up of primarily native Argentinians, meaning their members had the right to vote in elections.
The Yrigoyen government, not wanting to sacrifice electoral success, was much more willing to
work with them to achieve a number of workplace improvements. While the Yrigoyen
government had reacted positively towards unions which were largely native in origin, they
continued to be especially brutal towards unions which were made up primarily of immigrants.
The policy [of nonviolence by the state] seemed directed mainly to the workers in the
federal capital – potential UCR voters in a district that the Radicals bitterly contested
with the Socialists – but did not extend to either the unions with a majority of members
who were foreigners or to the workers in the province of Buenos Aires. Thus, the 1918
strike of meatpacking workers, who were overwhelmingly foreigners, was dealt with by
using the traditional methods of repression, firings, and strikebreakers. 46

45
46

MacLachlan Pg. 78
Romero Pg. 31
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Political instability would grow as “social conditions, which were already complicated at the
moment the war erupted, grew worse. In the cities, there was inflation; real salaries lagged
behind and unemployment was high.”47 By 1922 however these tensions would be mollified by
the election of Marcelo de Alvear. His six years in power would be marked by a kinder attitude
towards unions and the working class, his policies “included such measures as full recognition
of the trade unions, retirement plans for commercial employees and railroad workers’ unions,
regulation of woman and child labor, and establishment of the first of May – turned into a
conciliatory Labor Day – as a national holiday.”48 Yrigoyen would go on to win the presidency
again in 1928, but his government would only last another two years before the Great
Depression would cripple the global economy and make his reign untenable.
“The year 1930 opens the gateway into modern Argentina.”49 In 1930 the first military
coup in Argentina overthrew the democratically elected government of President Yrigoyen; “it
would be another sixty-one years before an elected president would peacefully transfer power
to his successor.”50 This began the “infamous decade” of Argentina, and “[set] a precedent for
throwing out governments in times of economic trouble.”51 Political tendencies continued to
push towards nationalism and away from foreign dependence. As the trade relationship with
Britain began to collapse, Argentina was forced to move away from its agrarian export economy
towards manufacturing. A mass migration from the rural areas of Argentina to the urban center

47
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of Buenos Aires followed. Falling standards of living, rapidly slowing growth, and
unemployment (brought upon by the Great Depression) led to popular discontent. “These
changes helped to undermine the political base of conservatism by reducing the dominance of
agrarian producers, while enhancing the weight of sectors dependent upon, or sympathetic
towards, urban manufacturing.”52 With the onset of World War 2 came significant problems for
the Argentine economy.
The German conquests and the blockade dealt a blow to the Argentine economy that
was even more severe than that of 1929—30. Trade plummeted instantly: in 1940
exports shrank by 20 per cent. In 1938 40 per cent of Argentina's exports went to
Western Europe, but by 1941 the proportion had fallen to only 6 per cent, nearly all to
neutral Spain and Portugal. Britain imported most of Argentina's meat, and the British
market remained open, but the Continent now became inaccessible to most of
Argentina's grains, with the result that agriculture and farmers, rather than cattle and
ranchers, suffered by far the more serious effects of the war. By late 1940 shipping in
Argentine ports had fallen by half. Both exports and imports sank to levels below the
low point of the depression.53
Public outcry over fraudulent elections, industrial corruption, coupled with international
pressure from the United States, collapsing economic relationships with Western Europe, and
fear of Brazil “which the United States was now arming faster than any other country in the
region”54 led to discontent and plotting within the military. In 1943, fearing communist/popular
insurrection against the fraudulently elected conservative government of Ramón Castillo, the
military overthrew the President and established a military dictatorship which would last three
years. This three year period would see the political rise of Juan Domingo Perón.

52
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Perón was one of the key founding members of the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (United
Officers’ Group) which was one of the groups responsible for the planning and execution of the
1943 coup. This secret organization represented the nationalist faction within the military
dictatorship and following the successful deposition of Castillo were at odds with the liberal
faction. Perón and the nationalists were able to effectively take over the military junta, and
Perón – for his role in the coup – was rewarded with a position in the Departmento Nacional de
Trabajo (National Department of Labor). A month later, “the department was elevated to the
rank of Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision (Secretary of Labor and Welfare), with status
analogous to that of a ministry.”55 This elevation gave Perón significant political power.
With Peron at its head, the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision was granted both executive
and judicial functions, and expeditive powers not subject to recourse.... The operative
rule was the worker was always correct, and the Secretaria always sided with the
workers. This approach helped perpetuate a mythos around the Secretaria.... Peron had
only one objective: to capture the sympathy and support of the masses.56
Cultivating this relationship between the growing labor movement and the state was the key
function of Perón’s political position. Specifically Perón courted the Confederación General del
Trabajo de la República Argentina (General Confederation of Labor, CGT) and its leader Ángel
Borlenghi. In 1945 Perón was ousted from the Labor Department by his political enemies within
the military junta. Four days later Perón was arrested and sent to prison. Five days later, on the
17th of October, on what has now been dubbed ‘Loyalty Day’ in Argentina, the CGT held a
massive demonstration calling for Perón to be freed. That evening Perón was released and
delivered a speech from the balcony of the Casa Rosada (the Pink House), the official residence
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of Argentina’s President. This marks the beginning of Perón’s campaign for President of
Argentina.
The events of September-October 1945 demonstrated the extent to which in only two
years Peron had totally transformed Argentine politics: he had rendered the fifty-yearlong feud between the Radicals and the conservatives an anachronism; he had
precipitated the working class into politics, while virtually eliminating the traditional
working-class parties, in particular the Socialists; he had divided the country into the
'peronista supporters of 'economic independence' and 'social justice' and 'antiperonista’ defenders of the old liberal order.57
Perón was elected President of Argentina on February 24th, 1946. Originally running on a
Labour Party ticket in 1946, Perón would go on to found the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist
Party) the following year. Ángel Borlenghi was appointed interior minister, and given significant
oversight over the justice department and police enforcement. The period from 1945 to 1955
would be known as the Peronato.
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Chapter 2 - The Peronist Model
Raul Prebisch, arguably Argentina’s most prominent economist in the 20 th century, put
forth in his seminal work The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal
Problems an economic theory which is now known as dependency theory. According to a basic
understanding of this theory there exists core and periphery countries. Core countries – defined
as rich, industrialized economies, focused on the production of manufactured goods – engage
in trade with periphery countries – defined as poorer, industrially underdeveloped economies,
focused on the production of primary goods. Over time due to the variable demand elasticities
of manufactured goods (more elastic) and primary goods (less elastic), the terms of this trade
would begin to benefit core countries over periphery countries. As time progresses this
relationship is exacerbated; the dependency of weaker periphery economies on stronger core
economies deepens. This is an important contribution because it runs contrary to a linear
development model based around ‘stages’. In this traditional model, “the market mechanism
automatically [benefits] all countries, the large industrialized as well as the agricultural
economies, and the business cycle [regulates] the periodic ebbs and flows in the international
economy.”58 As time progresses, undeveloped economies will go through a linear series of
‘stages of development,’ where they will eventually achieve developed status.
According to one reading of Prebisch “neither the doctrine of comparative advantage,
nor the workings of the business cycle, automatically work for emerging economies such as
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Argentina.”59 Instead, due to the fact that “terms of trade for agricultural commodity producers
like Argentina [are] in historical decline,”60 periphery economies (and specifically Argentina)
need to actively pursue development through industrialization. Prebisch himself writes
“Industrialization is not an end in itself, but the principal means at the disposal of those
countries of obtaining a share of the benefits of technical progress and of progressively raising
the standard of living of the masses.”61 As chairman of Argentina’s central bank, and later as the
executive director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and
secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Prebisch argued that periphery countries, in order to “resist subordination of the national
economy to foreign movements and contingencies, must develop inward (“desarrollo hacia
adentro”), strengthen [their] internal structure, and achieve autonomous functioning of [their
economies].”62 This statement became the basis for what is now known as import substitution
industrialization (ISI). It is clear in Prebisch’s framework that industrial policy, which is “defined
as the strategic effort by the state to encourage the development and growth of a sector of the
economy,”63 is a key strategy in answering the ‘principle problems’ of Latin America’s economic
development. ISI is one type of industrial policy which focuses on replacing foreign imports with
domestic production of manufactured goods, in order to reduce foreign dependence.
Alternatively, export substitution industrialization (ESI) argues that industrialization is achieved
via the traditional path of comparative advantage. In this framework countries specialize in
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producing what they are ‘naturally’ good at, and then trade with other countries. This process
then creates the necessary income to fund industrialization.
The relevance of these two competing theories is that they represent competing models
by which a country can achieve development. The focus of this paper, as laid out in the
introduction, is to determine if Juan Domingo Perón’s economic policies were the cause of the
Argentine paradox – which, briefly restated, is how Argentina achieved development at the
beginning of the 20th century but proceeded to regress back into a developing economy. In
order to answer this question primary question, we must first answer a series of secondary
questions. These are:
1. Does Peronism represent a coherent theoretical economic model?
2. How does this model, if it exists, manifest itself in terms of policies enacted by the
Peronist government from 1946 to 1955?
3. What effect did said policies have?
4. Were these policies consistent with the historical circumstances of Argentina, and
contemporary development theory?
How do these secondary questions help answer the primary question of this paper? Well, if no
Peronist model exists it cannot be to blame for the country’s economic reversal. One could
argue that a lack of a coherent model is a cause for economic stagnation, but since I will assert
shortly that a model does exist I ignore this possibility. If a theoretical model does exist then
certainly we must analyze how such a model was implemented and the effects it had in order
to judge if the model was responsible. Finally if the model was not in line with historical
circumstances, i.e. it was imposed a priori, then certainly it can be found at fault for not
adequately addressing the problem facing the Argentine economy at the close of World War 2.

Gansley-Ortiz 23

However, if the model is in line with the historical circumstances, i.e. it was the only available
set of options based on contemporary conditions, then we could argue that it was the external
conditions and not the model which was responsible for Argentina’s economic regression.
This chapter will attempt to answer these four secondary question via a historical
analysis of Peronism. This first subsection will deal with the theoretical basis of Peronism,
focusing on answering the secondary question “Does Peronism represent a coherent
theoretical economic model?” As I will assert later, Peronism does in fact represent a model
concerned with then current global political reality. Perón is elected President of Argentina in
1946, a time of great political crisis. The global economy, having contracted due to a world war,
was just beginning to recover. Simultaneously the United States was emerging as a global
superpower and was in direct contention with the Soviet Union for global supremacy – the Cold
War. Perón, having been stationed in Europe in 1939, was well aware of the political tensions
beginning to take hold of the globe – namely the competition between capitalism and
communism, and growing social tension between the rich and poor. Peronism represents, in my
estimation, a sincere attempt at subverting what Perón saw as imminent class warfare. For this
reason I have decided to separate labor policy from other Peronist economic policies and treat
them both separately. This chapter will proceed as follows, first a subsection examining the
philosophical basis for Peronism, then a subsection examining the labor policies of Peronism,
following that a subsection examining Peronism’s industrial policy, trade policy, and more
general macro-policy, and finally a concluding section which will tie together these analyses.
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Subsection 1 – What is Peronism? The Intellectual and Philosophical basis for
Justicialismo
To begin, we must answer the question ‘does Perón have a coherent economic model?’
Peronism is considered by some to be an entirely unfeasible and purely rhetorical piece of
political opportunism. Treating it as such hamstrings thoughtful analysis of its political and
economic implications. Instead I put forward that the Peronato saw the development of a
robust political, economic, and social ideology, known as justicialismo, whose “avowed
intention was to find a 'Third Position' between capitalism and socialism.”64 In 1939 Perón was
stationed in Italy where he studied at the University of Turin and came into contact with a
variety of governmental and economic systems. Notable among them were Mussolini’s fascism,
Marxist-Leninism, and social democracy. This diverse education led to his own eclectic ideology.
“The interesting thing about Peronism as an ideology was that its leader claimed to be able to
draw on the best of the western humanist tradition in order to produce a theory of social
solidarity that eschewed class conflict.”65 Peronism relied on support from across the traditional
political spectrum; specifically the church, the military, and the labor movement. “The hallmark
of Peron's political thought, then, is its eclecticism. In a sense Peron can be thought of as a
scavenger of two millennia of social thought.”66 This ‘eclectic’ ideology relies on “three main
strands in the history of western thought”67 the Ancient world, Christianity, and Machiavellian
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‘positivism’. In terms of rhetoric, Peronism is presented as a Christian ‘third way’ ideology
which is equally critical of Capitalism and Communism.
Capitalism comes in for particular criticism from Peron. He describes it as a cold force of
accumulation, which owes no national allegiance and as it is without a country is also
without a heart, in a word an agglutination of all that is most spurious about money.
International capitalism is par excellence a cold and inhuman force…Finally, and for
Peron this is most important, capitalism has neither a clear sense of direction nor a
distinct ideology, Capitalists are unable to explain what their aims for the future of the
world are, what they owe to history or what their place is in historical process.
Capitalism lacks a 'Weltanschauung', in a word, and for Peron no political tendency is
credible without one.68
Similarly “Communism is opposed as being simply the mirror image of capitalism and an effect
of the latter; because it is 'totalitarian'.” The lack of weltanschauung – a particular philosophy
or view of life – leaves both ideologies fundamentally flawed. Instead Peronism, guided by
Christian morality, seeks to find the “optimum point of organization” through a dialectical
process “between competing values, each of them intrinsically undesirable: individualism and
collectivism, idealism and materialism, liberalism and socialism, capitalism and communism.”
Peronism is often termed a fascist ideology, although some scholars have taken issue to
this characterization. Certainly Peronism is informed by fascism, especially in its corporatist
economic model. Regardless, Peronism is universally agreed upon to be a left wing populism
which tends towards the authoritarian, especially during the latter half of Perón’s first
presidency. Unlike the right wing ideologies of Mussolini and Franco, Peronism relied heavily on
unions and the working class. Sociologist Carlos de la Torre writes,
Perón radically changed the significance of words used to denigrate subaltern groups such as descamisados – into the essence of true Argentine identity. Perón also widened
the significance of key words of his epoch such as democracy, industrialism, and working
68
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class. "Perón explicitly challenged the legitimacy of a notion of democracy which limited
itself to participation in formal political rights and he extended it to include participation
economic life of the nation." The meaning of industrialism was articulated anew within
social and political parameters, while the individual workers became instead the
working class. Words like pueblo and oligarquía acquired concrete meanings with Perón,
as opposed to their purely rhetorical use. El pueblo became el pueblo trabajador.69
In this framework, Labor becomes an active participant in the shaping of Peronist ideology.
Unlike Mussolini and Franco’s exclusively top down approach, Peronism was also “a creation of
the workers who continued to shape and reshape its tenets to a point where Peron himself
could hardly recognize his own offspring. If the Argentine working class was redefined by Peron,
his own policies were redefined by the working class.”70 The impact of this back and forth is an
economic ideology which placed heavy emphasis on meeting the needs of workers. Rightly or
wrongly Perón’s Argentina heavily favored labor; which resulted in policies aimed towards
higher wages, greater work protections, and a number of social safety nets. De la Torre writes
Contrary to previous governments that did not address workers' demands for social
security and labor legislation, Perón in his post as the head of the National Labor
Department (1943-45) met labor demands. Moreover, due to his power in the military
government, Perón was able to coopt and repress the labor movement in accordance
with his interests. In the 1946 elections and throughout his first two presidential
periods, Perón thus counted on the support of most of the Argentine working class, who
acted rationally in supporting a leader favorable to their short-term interests.71
It also included a process of societal restructuring, a string of industry nationalizations,
government interventionism, and a number of questionable macro-development policies –
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including import substitution industrialization and the institution of “bilateral trade, exchange
controls and multiple exchange rates.”72

Subsection 2 – Peronism and Labor: A Special Relationship
In terms of executing these plans, Peronism in practice takes on the appearance of
corporatism, “a system of social organization that has at its base the grouping of men according
to the community of their natural interests and social functions, and as true and proper organs
of the state they direct and coordinate labor and capital in matters of common interest.” 73
Corporatism has always been associated with religious institutions, namely the Catholic Church,
and has been used to describe multiple (and vastly different) political regimes including fascist
Italy. “It is possible to distinguish among corporatist systems that are state or societal, IberoCatholic, traditional, or modern "rationalist," inclusionary or exclusionary, bifrontal or
segmental.”74 These different forms of corporatism result in different economic organizations.
Peronism is a form of inclusionary corporatism, an idea which will be expanded upon shortly.
Within Argentina the general corporations – the organic socio-political groupings of men – are
labor, business, the church, the military, and the state. The ideology of Peronism is concerned
with the collective bargaining going on between these groups, with the state as the primary
mediator. We can see the unique way in which mediation is enacted through Perón’s writings
'Those who represent capital and those who are the workers should adjust their
relationship to more Christian rules of community life and mutual respect for each other
as fellow human beings.... Our movement is a movement of united Christianity.... Both
72
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the representatives of capital and labour should conform to more Christian principles
and have more respect for each other.75
Here Perón subverts class conflict by centering a Christian message which culturally unites
Argentina. “Before Peronism, half of Argentina was Christian, half was socialist or
communist.”76 After the Peronato there were Peronists and anti-Peronists. Between 1916 and
2015 every democratically elected President of Argentina was either a Peronist or a Radical (a
centre-left socially liberal party); since 1983 only two of seven Presidents were not members of
the Justicialist party. Peronism did away with traditional left-right politics and replaced it with a
dialectical populism under the careful command of Juan Domingo Perón.
Peronism was involved in both collective bargaining and central planning. “Perón can be
placed alongside other ‘Third-World’ advocates of national planning such as Nehru, Sukarno,
Nkrumah, Kubitschek and Nasser.”77 In 1946 Perón presented his first five-year plan to the
Argentine National Congress.
[The plan] covered a wide range of issues: agricultural and industrial policy, public
health, social insurance, housing and public works construction, international relations,
and state finances, among others… Estimates provided by the regime reveal a steady
growth in infrastructure and public resources. Millions of Argentines were incorporated
into retirement, health, and social assistance programs. New roads and bridges were
constructed, and the number of persons with running water and sewerage grew from
6.5 million and 4 million respectively in 1942 to 10 million and 5.5 million in 1955.78
The three major objectives of the Perón regime were:
The expansion of public spending, giving the state a stronger role in production and
distribution; the alteration of relative prices to encourage a more egalitarian distribution
of national income; and the progressive accumulation of a system of incentives that
75
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rewarded activities oriented towards the internal market and discouraged production
destined for international markets.79
This was a major shift in economic policy, and required significant structural changes. Perón
nationalized the banks, the foreign owned railways, and completely paid off the significant
amounts of foreign held debt (specifically to Great Britain). This period also saw the creation of
the Instituto Argentino para la Promocion y el Intercambio (Argentine Institute for the
Promotion of Trade) (IAPI), “an entity that had a virtual monopoly over foreign trade, provided
the government with indirect access to the principal source of capital accumulation and
permitted the diversion of the rise in export prices to benefit the public sector.”80 Profits from
the IAPI helped fund the growing Argentine welfare state. Improvements in wages, growth in
union membership – from 877,300 in 1946 to 1,532,900 in 1948 and “the rate of unionization
climbed by 50 to 70 percent” –, and the creation of Latin America’s most vibrant middle class
are all achievements associated with the Peronato.
As mentioned above, the relationship between labor and the state is arguably the
defining characteristic of Peronism. When Perón began running for President he represented a
rallying point for opposition. The Radical Civic Union (social democrats), the National
Democratic Party (conservatives), the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the United
States of America all vehemently opposed Perón. “[Perón] faced the challenge of contesting an
election against a coalition that comprised nearly all of the political parties with little
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organization of his own.”81 In October of 1945 his entire political base was Buenos Aires union
members. This was a bold political strategy on the part of Perón.
Whereas in the 1930s, workers were treated like animals and were told they “weren’t
worth anything,” and in the 1940s, even their own political parties spoke down to them,
assuming that they constituted “a morally and intellectually inferior audience,” Perón
gave the descamisados (the poor and downtrodden – literally, ‘the shirtless’) a strong
sense of dignity and self-respect. Even the term ‘decamisado’ is an excellent example of
this. The word had previously been used as an epithet to signify the inferiority of the
lower class, but in Peronism, it was inverted; Perón reclaimed it as a declaration of selfworth and pride. In his speeches, Perón praised the descamisados, saying they were the
“true Argentine people,” and he spoke publically about the problems that they had
previously been told were private affairs.82
Perón also engaged in significant coalition building, and not only won his presidential election in
1946, but also won re-election in 1951 with 62.5% of the vote. Perón, through corporatist
mechanisms, cultivated this special relationship.
The Peronist regime represents an inclusionary corporatism. “Inclusionary state
corporatist systems employ a broad array of inducements coupled with the selective
application of constraints to encourage and reward labor cooperation with government.”83 This
strategy of inducements began in 1943, and continued throughout the entire Peronato. As
Secretary of Labor “laws were dictated regarding the registration and legalization of unions
depending on their degree of support for the authorities.”84 In 1947 the CGT, Perón’s political
core, became the only recognized union in Argentina. Perón created a “vertical framework that
centrally and exclusively controlled the organized labor movement from above.”85 This was
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done through the Labor Department, headed by Perón’s wife Eva. According to Perón “’the
Justicialista state defends union organizations, and these sustain the Justicialista state,’ in which
national labor administration embodied a ‘profoundly patriotic humanism that makes it distinct
from all other public agencies.’"86 This relationship was designed to benefit both labor and
Perón, however “it was the state, not the unions, who was the dominant partner in this alliance
and who therefore ultimately controlled the fortunes of the working classes.”87

Subsection 3 – Trade, and Industrialization
Having laid out Perón’s special relationship with Labor, we can now turn to the other
practical manifestations of Peronism. As has been mentioned before, Peron engaged in a series
of industry nationalizations, actively pursued interventionist policies, and was forced to
radically redefine Argentina’s trade relationships. Political neutrality until late in World War 2
hurt Argentina’s standing on the world stage; specifically as a result of U.S. influence.
When Perón became president in 1946, Argentina was the only Latin American country
that did not belong to the IMF and World Bank. Argentina was not a member because
the United States had decided it should not be. In April 1943, US Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., with the full support of Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
had demonstrated his firm intention to exclude Argentina (and other nations neutral in
World War II) from the foundational event of both institutions. In May 1944 the US
government sent out the invitations to participate in the Bretton Woods conference. All
the nations of Latin America were invited except Argentina.88
While Argentina would be a founding member of the United Nations, they would not be
admitted into the IMF until 1956, a year after Perón was overthrown by a military coup. As was
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established in the introduction, shifting terms of trade were a key concern in post-war
Argentina. This section will begin by discussing the shifting terms of trade in the post-war era
and how that influenced Perón’s nationalist economics. From there we can analyze the effects
of these policies on Argentina’s agricultural sector – which, as was established in the first
chapter, represented the backbone of Argentina’s pre 1914 economic growth policy. This will
result in an investigation in how the historical circumstances effected the industrialization path
of Argentina. To return to the secondary questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, this
section will look to directly address questions two and three.89
During the Second World War there was a contraction in the global market place.
European nations, once the supplier of the world’s manufactured goods, had retooled their
industry to produce for war. Include the fact that the major powers all had significant navies, it
is clear that global trade going from core countries to periphery countries had decreased.
Historian Claudio Belini writes, “The principal problem faced by the Argentine economy was the
decline in imports of consumer and capital goods. The reorientation of industrialized economies
towards war production, which caused the withdrawal of a great variety of manufactures from
the world market, encouraged ISI.”90 This was only exacerbated by U.S. foreign policy; “as early
as 1942, and until the end of the 1940s Argentina was treated under U.S. trade policy as an
enemy nation. A partial fuel embargo was applied, and Argentina was denied other vital
imports, over and beyond the restrictions imposed by the war.”91 As a result of decreased
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exports by the traditional manufacturing countries, markets were left wanting. Argentina, who
had some industrial development, used this as an opportunity to enter these markets with their
own manufactures.
Between 1939 and 1945, Argentina’s total exports increased 55 per cent while industrial
exports rose 625 per cent. Between 1939 and 1943, the period in which industrial
exports hit their highest point during wartime, growth reached 762 per cent. In 1939 the
sale of industrial products abroad had represented only 2.9 per cent of the total export
trade; by 1943 it had reached a peak of 19 per cent, a value that would not be repeated
during the following decades.92
Belini includes two illustrative figures in his paper, one displaying the destination of Argentine
goods, and the other their composition (to the United States). I have included them here:

It is clear from these graphics that Argentina experienced a significant growth in market share
amongst other Latin American countries, while also providing goods to the United States, the
United Kingdom, and other nations involved in the war. “One of the characteristics of foreign
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trade during the war was its reorientation towards South American markets. In the case of
manufactures, the distribution according to destination shows an important diversification of
markets.”93 It is interesting to note that while the United States actively tried to deny Argentina
from importing, they still bought Argentina’s exports. These exports did shrink however after
the U.S. joined the war effort, which prompted a growth in exports to Argentina’s close
neighbors. Latin American markets “altogether they represented 47 per cent of industrial
exports, while the countries neighboring Argentina represented 28 per cent of sales.”94 These
markets became viable options due to “the US ban on the export of certain products,” and the
total retooling of their economy to the war effort. This export growth allowed Argentina to pay
off all of their foreign debt95 (done under the Peronist government) and establish “favorable
balances of trade.”96
At the end of the war, Argentina found itself free of external debt and in possession of
substantial reserves of foreign currency, benefiting from high demand and high prices
for its food exports and a growing industrial base. Within this framework, the Peronista
administration implemented an economic policy with three major objectives: the
expansion of public spending, giving the state a stronger role in production and
distribution; the alteration of relative prices to encourage a more egalitarian distribution
of national income; and the progressive accumulation of a system of incentives that
rewarded activities oriented towards the internal market and discouraged production
destined for international markets.97
However, overall confidence in maintaining this war time growth after peace was restored was
low, hence the push for the economic program described above.
By the end of the war, positions advocating industrialisation had been strengthened. A
trend of thought composed of economists, engineers, military officers and business
93
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leaders held that it was essential to protect, though with some limits, the industries that
had been born during the war. The renewal of world trade instilled fears that a sector of
the industry that had surfaced under emergency conditions and had used its equipment
intensively would now succumb, bringing about unemployment and social unrest. A
report prepared by the Consejo Nacional de Posguerra (National Post-War Council)
estimated that 70,000 direct jobs in the manufacturing sector would be lost, together
with a similar loss of indirect employment. Exporting industries would be the ones to
suffer most, with a loss of 70 per cent of the total, around 32,000 jobs.98
For these reasons some scholars argue that “Peronist economic policies were not as aberrant as
many have contended.”99 Instead they should be understood in their historical context. Latin
American historian James P. Brennan argues that “the decision to use wartime reserves on the
nationalization of the railroads and other foreign-owned businesses and repatriation of the
external debt had much to do with the fact that Argentina’s reserves were frozen as
inconvertible sterling deposits in British banks.”100 Similarly movements towards internal
production for domestic demand, and switching to an ISI model was “at least partly the result
of U.S. agricultural policies that undermined Argentina’s traditional agricultural exports,
especially the continuing restrictions on Argentine farm products in the U.S. market and the
decision to forbid recipients of foreign aid under the Marshall Plan to purchase Argentine
goods.”101 This analysis falls in line with Prebisch’s own, who writes “It is under these new
conditions of international economy, that the process of industrialization has begun to develop
in Latin America. The fundamental problem lies in adaptation to these conditions—in so far as
they cannot be altered—while seeking new rules in keeping with the new circumstances.”102
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For Perón a major aspect of maintaining a healthy economy was dependent on
achieving high levels of employment. This is clear based on the rapid expansion of public
employment, made possible through his ambitious industrial nationalization project. “Between
1945 and 1955, the national civil service expanded from 203,300 to 394,900, while the creation
of state-owned steel mills, oil refineries, shipyards, and armaments plants helped boost the
number employed in state enterprises and autonomous agencies from 109,000 to 148,300.” 103
Similarly, Perón’s government was heavily invested in increasing income to be spent
domestically. “In 1945, Peron created two institutions that would later boost wages: the
National Institute of Compensation, which implemented a minimum wage and collected data
on wages, prices, and living standards, and the Aguinaldo – a bonus that gave each worker a
lump sum at the end of the year amounting to one-twelfth of the annual wage.”104 For
industrial workers this corresponded to an increase of real wages “by 53% between 1946 and
1949.”105 This is significant in terms of GDP, which is calculated by C+I+G+Nx=GDP, where
C=consumption, I=investment, G=government spending, and Nx= net exports. Increase in real
wages translates into either money spent on consumption, or money saved. The period 19461949 was considerably prosperous for the Argentine economy, but primarily in the industrial
sectors in urban centers. Prominent Latin American economist Carlos Diaz-Alejandro wrote that
“the Argentine economy boomed during 1946-48” as a result of “favorable export prices and
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[foreign] reserves accumulated during the war.”106 His hundred year study of Argentina’s
economy, in comparison to Australia’s, includes a useful breakdown of employment in 1947,
which is reproduced here.

As the table shows a substantial percentage of the male working population (1/4 th) still worked
in the agricultural sector in 1947. However a growing number of men had moved to industrial
occupations, including general manufacturing (22.1%). Alternatively, nearly half (43.4%) of work
eligble women were concentrated in the service industry, taking place primarily in urban
centers. The unemployment rate for men (2.8%), is significant because it is considerably below
the controversial “natural” rate of unemployment. The Phillips-curve suggests that there exists
a negative relationship between inflation and unemployment. According to the model, as a
country moves closer to full employment – or a 0% unemployment rate – wages will rise
causing inflation. In 1949 Argentina was beset with an inflation crisis:
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At its peak in November, inflation reached a rate of 37.4%. MacLachlan estimates inflation to be
have been around 68% annual going into the 1950s107. According to MacLachlan, this was a
result of “wages [becoming] a political reward rather than an exchange for time and labor.”108
Other scholars, including the contributing writers of the Cambridge History of Latin America,
point to Perón’s pursuit of full employment and the welfare state as the major cause for
Argentina’s inflationary troubles.109 The link between employment and inflation has been called
into question by a number of scholars, including Post-Keynesian economists who adovacte
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). Since 1944 Argentina has experienced a number of
inflationary events, including inflation reaching 20,000% in the first quarter of 1990. These
events correspond to varying levels of unemployment (8% in 1989), indicating that some other
factor is a more dominant determinant.
Regardless of whether or not Perón’s pursuit of full employment was responsible for
Argentina’s inflation problems during his Presidency, monetary policy made up a key aspect of
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his economic policies. The manipulation of exchange rates and import/export prices was a key
aspect of Peronist policy. To this end Perón created the Instituto Argentino para la Promoción
del Intercambio (Institute for the Promotion of Foreign Trade). “IAPI, as it came to be known as,
took control over foreign trade and became one of the major policy tools for the incoming
Peronist government.” Working in conjunction with the Argentine central bank, the IAPI
“served three major goals: a) to guarantee stable prices for the producers and, hence, to
minimize their risks; b) to make sure that the profits that had formerly been siphoned off by
large transnational corporations such as Bunge & Born would hitherto remain in Argentina; and
c) to secure higher prices for Argentina’s producers on the world market.”110 Technically the
IAPI was signed into law by General Edelmiro Farrell, but this was done at the behest of Perón
who had just won the election and was waiting to be sworn in as President. Functionally, the
IAPI was a state run agricultural monopsony which “replaced middlemen in the purchasing and
marketing of agricultural commodities. The idea to buy directly from producers and sell to
foreigners as expensively as possible would provide capital for other schemes.”111 Historian
Gisela Cramer, who wrote a history of the IAPI, argues that this organizational structure served
three purposes.
From a macroeconomic perspective, there existed three outstanding reasons to create
such an export monopsony. Firstly, as mentioned above, it served as a means to
strengthen Argentina’s bargaining position in order to positively influence the country’s
terms of trade. Secondly, it generated considerable funds that were more than welcome
in view of the vast and costly reform program the Peronist government had just started
to implement. Thirdly, IAPI served as a means to counteract inflationary pressures. By
establishing a buffer between the internal and the external prices for agricultural
commodities, IAPI kept the internal prices for food artificially low and, as such, helped to
stabilize the cost of living. This benefited, above all, Perón’s foremost political clientele:
110
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urban low wage households that had to spend a relatively large proportion of their
income for food.112
As has been argued above, a key issue facing Argentina was its deteriorating terms of trade.
This was a result of U.S. policy, the recovery of traditional industrial economies, and the market
phenomena of decreasing prices for primary products as argued by Prebisch in his promotion of
dependency theory.113 The IAPI represents an attempt by the Peronist government to stem this
tide, by becoming directly involved in the bargaining process. This is in some ways similar to the
government’s role in collective bargaining between capitalists and labor described in subsection
2 of this chapter. Prebisch argues that wage rigidities in core countries necessitate economic
contractions in periphery countries during times of economic downturn. He writes,
During the upswing, part of the profits [in core countries] are absorbed by an increase in
wages, occasioned by competition between entrepreneurs and by the pressure of trade
unions. When profits have to be reduced during the downswing, the part that had been
absorbed by wage increases loses its fluidity, at the centre, by reason of the well-known
resistance to a lowering of wages. The pressure then moves toward the periphery, with
greater force than would be the case if, by reason of the limitations of competition,
wages and profits in the centre were not rigid. The less that income can contract at the
centre, the more it must do so at the periphery.114
Ostensibly, the IAPI and the Ministry of Labor would have allowed the government to respond
readily to such contractions. However, Perón’s political reliance on labor, as well as his
ideological aversion to class conflict, and his economic goals of wealth redistribution, made
such deliberate contractions unviable. The “IAPI was one of the central mechanisms to
implement a massive redistribution of income that benefited industrialists and urban
consumers, particularly the urban working class, and rested on funds channeled out of the
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agricultural export sector and on a thorough distortion of prices.”115 As such, the IAPI set
agricultural buying prices low, and as a legally established monopsony had the market power to
achieve that end. These “redistributive strategies at first showed impressive results in terms of
(urban) employment, real wages and industrial growth.”116 However, as Cramer points out, the
artificial suppression of prices “acted as a major disincentive for the production of [Argentina’s
traditional] export commodities.”117
Due to the establishment of the IAPI, and its subsequent policies of agricultural price
suppression, Perón’s presidency is cited as a major cause for Argentina’s economic problems.
Cramer calls it “one of the major sins Juan Domingo Perón committed in the realm of economic
policy making.”118 This follows from a belief that there existed two paths towards
industrialization, one based on import substitution, and another based on exports of primary
goods. “Argentina’s slow growth during the second half of the twentieth century has been
attributed to the inward-looking model adopted by the administration of Juan Domingo Perón
during the post-war years.”119 It is argued that Perón, in his pursuit of the path of internal
industrialization, destroyed a viable export led growth path. This is predicated on the
assumption that following 1945 “external conditions for Argentina’s exports were
improving.”120 Belini however calls this assumption into question. He writes, “Argentina did not
face two opposing alternatives. In spite of the export boom during the war, industry did not
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possess the competitive capacity necessary to confront the resumption of world trade;
consequently, a strategy based on industrial exports did not offer an alternative path.”121 As
such, only an ISI model was availble to Argentina during the Peronato. He argues that the
agricultural sector was already experiencing a contraction prior to the Peronist presidency, and
that this corresponded with the increase in industrial exports seen during the Second World
War.
In the first place, this increase in industrial exports occurred at the same time as a
substantial drop in agricultural exports. Taking 1938, a relatively normal year, as the
base, agricultural exports shrank 36 per cent in volume between 1938 and 1945. The
decline would be greater if we stopped in 1943, when they were 54 per cent lower than
in 1938. Altogether, agricultural exports went from representing 80 per cent of the
volume of Argentine trade to representing 62 per cent in 1942–43. Their share in the
total value of exports dropped from 50 to 32 per cent between 1938 and 1945. They
were at their lowest in 1941-43, when they fell to 23 per cent of the total.122
This rapid decrease in the viability of agricultural exports would have been fresh in the mind of
Perón’s government. As such, policy makers were interested in “[breaking] the link between
internal prices and world prices.”123 This way shocks to the international commodities markets
could be minimized by the government. In favorable times, the IAPI could buy low from
agricultural producers and sell high to foreign markets, generating revenue which could then be
repurposed towards the urban economy and industrialization. In unfavorable times, the IAPI
could maintain low domestic food prices to ensure that the people of Argentina would remain
fed.
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It is clear however that the export oriented agricultural sector suffered in Argentina due
to Perón’s emphasis on industrialization. The IAPI’s “rock bottom prices…resulted in a drastic
drop in grain and beef production.”124 Diaz-Alejandro found
The low priority given to exports and other Peronist policies had a sharp negative impact
on Pampean production of rural exportable goods, particularly cereals and linseed,
whose per capita output in 1945-49 was 57 percent of the 1935-39 level; during 195051' per capita production of cereals and linseed were only 46 percent of the 1935-39
level. Livestock did better; as labor flowed out of Pampean areas that land-intensive
activity actually had an incentive to expand, in spite of the overall Peronist policies
toward exportable rural goods…Taking the aggregate of all rural activities, their per
capita production shows a decline of about 11 percent between 1935-44 and 194554.125
Agricultural production for domestic use saw some expansion however. Again, Diaz-Alejandro
reports, “other rural activities selling overwhelmingly in the domestic market, as in the case of
most of those outside the Pampean area, experienced substantial expansion.”126 It is clear that
while Pampean agriculture suffered, other areas of the country did experience some prosperity.
An additional factor in the failure of the Pampean region was severe droughts that plagued the
area in the 1950s. Finally, Belini identifies currency manipultion as a key aspect of industrial
policy. He writes,
Currency appreciation was the other side of industrialisation policy, which was based on
income redistribution from the primary export sector to industry and the urban
economy. On the one hand, the exchange rate lag and the state monopoly on exports
delinked the domestic prices of primary products, which were also wage goods, from
the world market. During the years in which world prices of grain and meat increased,
this policy allowed the state to capture part of the extraordinary income and, at the
same time, to improve real wages by keeping the price of wage goods low. On the other
hand, industry benefited from a low exchange rate which made the import of machinery
and inputs cheaper. Producers in the pampa were the worst hit, as their income fell at a
time in which they had to invest in machinery and plant. Exporting industries also
124
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suffered the effects of the lag and although incentives were offered, they were not
enough.127
It is clear that such policies benefited the industries that Perón was trying to build up, but had a
negative effect on Argentina’s traditional economy. Such a preference is in line with the onepath view that argues exports would not be sufficient to continue to push the economy
forward, but lies in contrast with traditionalist theories who are opposed to ISI.

Chapter 2: Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter I posed four questions to guide my investigation into
the Argentine paradox. Here in the conclusion I would like to go back to them, and tie together
the many threads presented above. The first: “Does Peronism represent a coherent theoretical
economic model?” I posit that it does. As argued in the first subsection of this paper, Peronism
represents a sincere desire on the part of Juan Domingo Perón to avoid class conflict and lead
Argentina into the future by combining what he saw as the best elements of Capitalism,
Communism, western ‘pragmatic’ philosophy, and Catholicism. Far from being an impossible
synthesis, Perón established a long lasting populist Corporatism which has maintained its
influence on the Argentine people despite periods of its direct suppression by the state. Above
all what makes this model function is its chief decider, Catholicism, and its intellectual
feedbacks from organized labor. This model also presented clear economic policies, informed
by Justicialismo’s social theory.
Second: “How does this model, if it exists, manifest itself in terms of policies enacted by
the Peronist government from 1946 to 1955?” I addressed this question directly in subsection’s

127

Belini Pg. 309-310

Gansley-Ortiz 45

two and three, by breaking down Peronist policies into two separate parts – labor policy, and
other macro-policy. In subsection two, I put forth an inclusionary corporatist model of labor
administration. In inclusionary corporatism, the State acts as primary arbiter in collective
bargaining between societies’ many corporations (meaning collectives based around shared
interests). In Argentina’s case this was done by enacting a vertical command structure within
the labor movement, ultimately answerable to Perón himself. In each industry only a single
union was state sanctioned, and their loyalty to the government was rewarded through state
support. This allowed Perón to use the labor movement – their strikes in particular – as a
weapon against economic and political opponents. It also involved a number of policies
favorable to labor, including better working conditions and a raise in wages. In subsection three
of this chapter I put forth Peronism’s industrial policy as informed by global conditions. Perón,
in the face of deteriorating terms of trade, U.S. political pressure, and at the behest of
Argentina’s leading economists and business leaders, pursued a path of import substitution
industrialization. In this model, Argentina focused on developing industries whose primary
production was intended for domestic markets. This came at the expense of promoting
industries, especially in the Pampas region, whose goods were intended for export.
Additionally, Perón created the Instituto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio, or IAPI,
which was designed to redistribute wealth to urban centers, disconnect domestic agricultural
prices from global agricultural prices, and build wealth for domestic industry by buying low
domestically and selling high globaly. Perón also attempted to pursue full employment through
a robust nationalization project – which notably included railroads and telephone cables – in
order to create public sector jobs to benefit unemployed workers. Finally, the Peronist
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government pursued a policy of intentional exchange rate manipulations to encourage different
import/export conditions depending on the needs of the economy.
The third question; “What effect did said policies have?” was also addressed in
subsections two and three. In subsection two I addressed Perón’s labor policies. The effects of
these policies can be seen in the creation of a vibrant middle class, the raise in wages in urban
industry, and growth in unionization rates. Argentina’s middle class was built on the
foundations of favorable labor policy. Simultaneously this made wages rigid, and an argument
can be made that these rigidities, and Perón’s political reliance on labor, made Argentina less
equipped to deal with economic contractions in core countries. Additionally, scholars like
MacLachlan point to Perón’s union favoritism as a reason for falling productivity – due to
worker holidays and paid time off – and because it reduced the capacity of businesses to fire
employees who were less productive. Similarly, in subsection three, it is made clear that
Perón’s other macro policies were highly controversial. While Belini claims that early ISI in the
1940s led to stable growth for a time, economic crises in 1949, and 1950-52, resulted in
significant policy failures. Perón’s manipulation of currency, and his pursuit of full employment,
were both cited as inflationary. The main economic problem in both 1949 and 1950-52 was
inflation. Additionally, the favoritism towards domestic markets, and the IAPI’s institutional
policies, were in part responsible for the deterioration of Argentina’s agricultural sector
(specifically in the Pampas).
Finally, the fourth question: “Were these policies consistent with the historical
circumstances of Argentina, and contemporary development theory?” This question was most
directly answered in subsection three of this chapter. This argument comes down to whether or
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not two development paths were open to Argentina at the close of World War 2. These paths
are ISI and export oriented industrialization (EOI). Some contend that at the end of the Second
World War, global markets began to recover, and at this time terms of trade would have
become more favorable to Argentine agricultural goods. As such, Perón went against a more
viable model in favor of ISI. Belini contends however that such an option was not realistic – that
EOI was not a model that could be followed based on historical conditions. Due to the political
influence of the U.S., Argentina was precluded from a number of markets and financial
institutions, making ISI the only viable option. I am inclined to agree with this assessment.
The reason I originally posed these questions was to better address the key question of
this entire project – can we blame Peronism for the Argentine paradox. So how do these
questions help us answer that one? Well, if a Peronist model didn’t exist we could not claim
that it was to blame for Argentina’s economic regression. Similarly, without understanding
Perón’s policies, there effects, and the historical context in which they were enacted, it would
be impossible to determine if his model was to blame. I feel it is important to note the positives
that came out of Perón’s policies, especially his work towards strengthening the unions,
growing the middle class, and pushing for full employment. It is well-known that currently
developed economies (most significantly the U.S. and U.K.) that the growth of their middle class
played a key role in their development. Even today Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn are
pushing to reinvigorate and regrow their nations’ middle class. Additionally, the history of the
labor movements in both countries have been intimately tied to their long term success.
Growing inequality in both nations has been tied directly to the systemic disenfranchisement of
organized labor. As such, Perón’s policies in promoting these factors should be understood in
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the same context. It is clear also that Perón’s push towards ISI, in the material way it was
executed, effectively depressed Argentina’s traditional source of wealth, the Pampas. It is up to
debate how that should be interpreted. I air on the side of Belini, who argues that such policies
were the result of historic circumstances, and as such cannot be solely attributed to Peronism. I
feel that such an interpretation is in line with the contemporary development theories that
Perón would have been influenced by – namely Raul Prebisch, Latin American structuralism,
and advocates of dependency theory.
So where does that leave a qualitative judgement of Peronism as an effective or
ineffective model? I contend at this point that we do not yet have a clear answer. The reason is
that some of Perón’s policies were demonstrably good for a great number of Argentines,
however, some of them were not. With such a mixed bag it becomes necessary to compare the
Peronist models with other successful ones. In this way we can compare and contrast different
policies and their resultant effects. To do this I will spend my third chapter comparing the
model I have established above with the much more successful “Asian Miracle Model.” My
reasons for choosing this as a point of comparison are two fold, the first is that the traditional
understanding of the Asian Miracle Model is one of Export Substitution Industrialization, which
sets up an excellent contrast to Perón’s ISI model. The second is that such comparisons were
done by economists evaluating the “Asian Miracle Model”, most notably the World Bank’s
official report and the analysis done of it by Turkish economist Dani Rodrik. This comparison will
take place in chapter three of this thesis.
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Chapter 3 – Peronism in Comparison: The Asian Miracle Model vs
Justicialismo
The first chapter of this project laid out the historical economic circumstances of
Argentina leading up to the rise of Juan Domingo Perón in the 1940s, culminating with his
election to the Presidency in 1946. The second chapter of this project then laid out a Peronist
economic model, taking into account his government’s labor policy, and other macro oriented
economic policies. This included a discussion of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), in
contrast to Export Substitution Industrialization (ESI), which has been the primary criticism of
Perón’s economic policy. I argued, in line with Claudio Belini, that this model was the result of
historical circumstances, and that ESI was not an available path to Argentina following World
War 2. I concluded the second chapter with a brief comment on the necessity to compare the
Peronist model with another model in order to better understand it. The focus of this chapter
will be that comparative analysis – specifically in comparison to the “Asian Miracle Model.”
I feel that such a comparison is both relevant and elucidating for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, both models are fundamentally concerned with the same problem: how to
industrialize and grow an economy in the 20th century. Second, while both models seek to
address the same fundamental question, they appear to have done so in contrasting ways with
radically different results. Later in the chapter I will challenge the assumption that the models
are entirely opposed. Finally, as is made clear in chapter 2 of this paper and in the World Bank’s
report entitled The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, both models
establish a large role for the government in economic development. In the first subsection of
this chapter, I will begin by presenting a brief summary of the traditional understanding of the
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East Asian model, as presented in the World Bank’s report. Then I will move on to the criticisms
of the report as presented by Turkish economist Dani Rodrik. This will establish what exactly we
mean when we say the Asian Miracle Model (henceforth referred to as AM model), and give a
number of points of comparison between the AM model and the Peronist model. Then, in
subsection two of this chapter, I will compare and contrast Argentina’s Peronist model, and the
results, with the AM model based around the comparison points generated in the first
subsection. Finally, I will use this analysis to briefly draw some conclusions about what was
successful/unsuccessful in the Peronist model, which will subsequently be expanded upon in
the conclusion section of this project.

Subsection 1 – The Asian Miracle Report and Rodrik’s Corrections to the Asian Miracle
Model
The so called high-performing Asian economies (HPAE) is traditionally held up as “an
example of what export-led growth can achieve in countries that chose to open themselves to
international trade.”128 In other words, in so far as an AM model exists it is fundamentally
oriented towards ESI. In fact “export push” policies are one of the three interventionist policies
mentioned in the World Bank report, and the only one which the report considers to be a
generalizable policy recommendation to other developing nations. Rodrik summarizes the
report’s argument for the benefit of exports as follows, “First, exports are alleged to be the
source of many technological spillovers to the rest of the economy. Second, it is argued that the
cross-country evidence demonstrates the growth benefits of openness. Third, the use of
exports as “performance standards” is claimed to have rendered government interventions
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more effective (and less costly) than they would otherwise have been.”129 These three benefits
allowed the HPAEs to experience an average GNP per Capita growth rate of nearly 6% for the
period 1965-1990, “due to superior accumulation of physical and human capital.”130 Of course
accumulation is not enough, the HPAEs were “also better able than most to allocate physical
and human resources to highly productive investments and to acquire and master
technology.”131 This was achieved through “a set of common, market-friendly economic
policies, leading to both higher accumulation and better allocation of resources.” 132
Fundamentally, the report sees the AM model as reinforcement of neoclassical principles –
market liberalization, openness to trade, and specialization due to comparative advantage –
while still making room for “some selective interventions”133 but only within specific context;
overall the report does not believe that majority of specific policies can be generalized as a
model for development. Public policy is desirable only in so far as it supports “good
macroeconomic management.”134 Rodrik contends however, that “despite a large body of
research, there is little consensus on the role that public policies have played in the spectacular
performance of East Asian economies.”135 This is due to a number of weaknesses in the Miracle
Report, both in neglecting certain variables and in drawing some spurious conclusions.
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Rodrik contends that “there is much more to [the HPAEs] story than outward
orientation,”136 and that “the [World Bank] report is too heavy-handed in attributing a key role
to what it calls “export-push strategies” and too quick in explaining away the various puzzles
that the HPAEs’ experience with trade raises.”137 Rodrik raises two broad critiques of the
report, the first is insufficient attention to initial economic conditions, and the second a
misunderstanding of the role of industrial policy in HPAEs.
Rodrik argues that when looking at the HPAEs, researches are presented with a great
variety of public policy strategies. This is in line with the summary of the Miracle Report, which
states “the eight economies studied used very different combinations of policies, from handsoff to highly interventionist.”138 Rodrik writes,
The model encompasses highly interventionist strategies (Japan and Korea) as well as
non-interventionist ones (Hong Kong, Thailand); explicitly redistributive policies
(Malaysia) as well as distributionally neutral ones (most of the rest); clientelism
(Indonesia, Thailand) as well as strong autonomous states (Korea, Japan, Singapore);
emphasis on large conglomerates (Korea) as well as small, entrepreneurial firms
(Taiwan). This range of strategies, all followed more or less successfully, suggests that
the search for a parsimonious explanation of the East Asian Miracle may well be
futile.139
Due to this variety, Rodrik suggests that “in searching for the secrets of the East Asian miracle,
the obvious first place to look is the set of initial conditions that preceded economic takeoff.”140 He argues that “there are two respects, not entirely unrelated, in which the HPAEs
differed substantially by 1960 from other developing countries at similar levels of
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development.”141 These are high levels of education, and low levels of inequality. In terms of
education, Rodrik points to high levels of primary schooling enrollment, and with the exception
of Singapore, exceptionally high rates of literacy.142 “All of the HPAEs had virtually universal
primary schooling by 1960, whereas the cross-country benchmark puts the expected primary
enrolment levels 30-40 percentage points below those observed in countries like Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan.”143 In terms of inequality, according to income and land Gini

coefficients selected by Rodrik from the 1960s, all HPAEs had a “striking degree of
equality…compared to other developing countries.”144 I have reproduced his table here – the
table includes Argentina as one of the comparative nations, making it additionally relevant to
this paper. Upon including these factors into a regression analysis for growth performance,
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Rodrik contends “in a statistical sense there is nothing miraculous about the HPAEs growth
performance.”145 In fact, “around ninety percent or more of the growth of Korea, Taiwan,
Malaysia, and Thailand can be “accounted” for by these countries’ exceptionally high levels of
primary school enrolment and equality around 1960.”146 In undervaluing initial conditions, the
report missed significant explanatory variables which are consistent across the HPAEs. The
question remains why were these initial conditions so important?
Rodrik explains the importance of initial levels of education in terms of human capital
stocks. First, there is a well-known connection between education and human capital. There is
also a well-established link between human capital stocks and growth. “Human capital makes
investment more productive, facilitates the transfer and adoption of advanced technology from
abroad, and enables the establishment of meritocratic, efficient, and capable public
administration.”147 As such, initial education conditions indicate that prior to their take-off
HPAEs had high stocks of human capital, and a reasonably well educated work force which was
able to translate that education into higher levels of productivity.
In terms of inequality, “initial results on the negative relationship between inequality
and growth have been subsequently shown to be statistically robust by Clarke (1993).”148
Rodrik presents two non-mutually exclusive theories as to why this may be the case. The first is
that “a sufficiently equal distribution of income is a prerequisite for industrialization, because
the middle class is the natural source of demand for home-based manufactures.”149 The second
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is that high levels of inequality lead to a number of negative political outcomes which may
produce instability and toxic investment environments. The argument goes that “inequality
results in demands to alter the established order; political instability in turn reduces
investment.”150 This pressure to redistribute wealth can take the form of protests, strikes, and
even political revolutions. In either case, Rodrik contends that without a sufficiently equal
society “the single-minded pursuit of economic growth which has been a characteristic of many
of the HPAEs could [not] have been maintained.”151
Moving on from initial conditions, Rodrik’s other issue with the Miracle Report is a
misunderstanding of industrial policy and government intervention in HPAEs. This begins with
confusion in the report regarding policy goals, and policy instruments. The Report identifies
three interventionist policies, “(i) “promotion of specific industries”; (ii) “mild financial
repression combined with directed credit”: and (iii) “export push”.”152 Promotion of specific
industries is a policy goal, while the other two are policy instruments. Incorrectly grouping them
together obfuscates the actual effects of industrial policy. As a result of this confusion, the
report makes a number of claims about export policy – exports resulted in technological
spillovers, openness is good for growth, and exports operated as performance standards which
made government intervention more effective – which Rodrik feels are unsupported or
unconvincing.
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To begin, “the report concludes that a high growth rate of manufactured exports, which
was a consequence of export-push policies of the HPAEs, led to an economy-wide increase in
TFP growth.”153 This was achieved through some mechanism by which HPAEs translated exports
into either direct foreign investment (DFI) or global technological exchange. Rodrik contends
that “the report provides no direct evidence to support this proposition,” and in fact includes in
a footnote that “DFI has been important as a source of investment growth neither in Japan, nor
in Taiwan, nor in Korea!”154 Moving to the second claim, Rodrik takes issue with the measures
of openness – done primarily through the David Dollar openness index. Rodrik writes that the
“openness index is essentially a measure of real exchange rate divergence. Its links to openness,
as economists understand the term (the ratio of trade to GDP, or the presence of import or
export restrictions), are tenuous.”155 Even if this measure accurately captured trade openness,
the argument that openness is was a significant factor doesn’t follow because “according to the
index, Japan’s and Taiwan’s economies were more “closed” during 1976-85 than Argentina’s,
Brazil’s, India’s, Mexico’s, the Philippines’, or Turkey’s!”156 Rodrik argues that the only
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence presented is “that overvalued exchange rates
are detrimental to long-run economic performance.”157 Finally, Rodrik doesn’t feel sufficient
evidence was provided in the report that exports function as performance standards, nor that
the presence of performance standards is unique to HPAEs.
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Having reviewed the Miracle Report through Rodrik’s lens I would now like to establish
the points of comparison I will address in subsection 2 of this chapter. The first is a comparison
of initial conditions. As shown above, initial conditions played a significant role in the success of
the HPAEs, and as such should be included in any AM model. How do initial conditions in
Argentina compare? The second point of comparison is in industrial policy. There is still much
controversy as to what industrial policies were effective both in the AM model and in the
Peronist model. Having called into question the role of exports in the AM model, is it fair to
claim that ESI is the correct path for development? Additionally, would pursuing a strictly ESI
model have resulted in better outcomes for Argentina? My final point of comparison will be
based around government efficiency – which I did not directly address in this subsection – and
whether or not the claim that HPAEs “were blessed with relatively incorruptible bureaucracies,”
in contrast to Argentina having an inefficient and corrupt government, is true.

Subsection 2 – Comparing the Asian Miracle Model and the Peronist Model of
Development
Having established the relevance of initial conditions, how do conditions compare in
Argentina to the HPAEs. I will begin by addressing income, and then move to land distribution.
British economist James A. Robinson argues,
Argentina’s pattern of inequality matches its political history, with inequality falling
during democratic periods and rising under dictatorships. Inequality fell rapidly during
the 1920s, rose at the end of the authoritarian 1930s and fell dramatically under Perón’s
more populist administration. After he was overthrown in 1955 it rose rapidly, stayed
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mostly unchanged during the 1960s and fell again during the second Peronist
administration from 1973 to 1976. After the 1976 coup, it rose dramatically. 158
This is in line with Perón’s income redistribution policies as described in chapter two. Given this
analysis, we know that the Gini coefficient reported by Rodrik in 1960 would have been higher
than a Gini coefficient taken during the Peronist government. However, Robinson’s published
Gini coefficients do not reach back to the Peronist period, and as such cannot be directly
compared. We do know that in 1960 income inequality was higher in Argentina than any HPAE
with the exception of Hong Kong. Given the trends described by Robinson, we can assume that
there was not sufficient income equality prior to the Peronist period to motivate the same
growth as experienced in the HPAEs. We might suppose that Perón’s move towards a more
equal income distribution, had it continued, would have had a positive effect on Argentina’s
growth in the second half of the 20th century. However, this is purely conjecture since
inequality did rise after the 1955 military coup. Land distribution is clearer cut in the Argentine
case. As described in chapter two, Argentina had a heavily imbedded landowner class,
especially in the Pampas. When Perón did attempt land reforms, the political pushback was
strong enough to prevent their implementation. In 1960, as reported by Rodrik, Argentina had
the most unequal distribution of land of any country observed in the study. In contrast, virtually
every HPAE engaged in some significant land reform project prior to their growth. As such we
can conclude that in terms of equality, Argentina was not sufficiently equal to take advantage
of the growth model pursued by the HPAEs.
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In terms of education, the story is a little more complex. Rodrik identifies education as a
key precondition because of its contributions to human capital. As mentioned above, the HPAEs
all had high levels of primary schooling in 1960, much higher than most other developing
nations. It is interesting to note however that Argentina was one of the earliest adopters of
state funded public schooling. Education was also radically expanded during the Peronist
period, especially in terms of vocational training. Historian Verónica Oelsner in her work
“Forging the Fatherland”: Work and Vocational Education in Argentina during Peronism (19941955) makes the case that education was a key aspect of Peronist development policy.
Specifically through the radical expansion of a “vocational education system, which grew
notably during his presidency (1946–1952 and 1952–1955).”159 At the beginning of the 20th
century Argentina had a literacy rate “between 35% and 45%.”160 By 1940 this had increased to
over 80%.161 By 1950 this had increased to just under 90% adult literacy.162 Additionally,
according to the line of best fit established in the UNESCO report, Argentina’s literacy rate was
significantly greater than other nations with similar levels of primary school enrollment
(Greece, Puerto Rico, Fiji, Cyprus, and Thailand). Based on UNESCO’s tracking of literacy rates in
developing countries, Argentina had a higher literate population in 1950 than any other
developing nation tracked, the next country (Cuba) only had a literacy rate of 75%.163
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For all intents and purposes, Argentina should have had the educational levels – and as
such the stock of human capital – necessary to take advantage of technological innovation.
However, this didn’t happen. I argue there are two compelling reasons why this is the case. The
first is that during the Peronist era, education was focused on workers, however, even at that
time education was becoming segmented between elites and the working class. This can be
seen in the steady growth of private school enrollment rates starting in 1940 which was “three
times higher than the annual growth rate of the public system for the same period.”164 There is
also “a direct (and very strong) relation between public enrolments and percentage of the
population with ‘Unsatisfied Basic Needs’.”165 Data shows that “for every ten students that
study in private institutions, nine belong to the most economically advanced sectors.”166
Dynamic differences in school choice; wherein the rich overwhelmingly choose to send their
children to private institutions, while the poor are forced to attend public schools, is indicative
of overall schooling quality. The mass exodus from public education by the rich beginning in the
40s can be understood in two ways – either the public schools were getting worse, or private
education was significantly better – but in either case it is a damning judgement on the quality
of Argentine public education. If public schools were of a sufficient quality, we could expect
that parents would choose to enroll them in free public education, as opposed to expensive
private education. There are obviously many factors which go into school choice (which will not
be addressed here), but the balance of price and quality is something which should not be
ignored. Additionally the literature surrounding public education in Argentina indicates the
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public schooling was more about national identity formation (as seen in the works of Oelsner
and Fogarty) and less about producing an intellectual class. This can be seen in the wide gulf
between primary and secondary school enrollment throughout the 20 th century. As noted in
The Economist,
The landowners who made Argentina rich were not so bothered about educating it:
cheap labour was what counted. That attitude prevailed into the 1940s, when Argentina
had among the highest rates of primary-school enrolment in the world and among the
lowest rates of secondary-school attendance. Primary school was important to create a
sense of citizenship, says Axel Rivas of CIPPEC, a think-tank. But only the elite needed to
be well educated.167
This attitude has been directly tied to industry formation and economic performance. “Without
a good education system, Argentina struggled to create competitive industries,” as such
“Argentina mainly consumed technology from abroad rather than inventing its own.”168 The
step between technological adoption, and technological innovation, has been the key focus of
literature on the middle income trap.
Related to this is the second point I want to discuss briefly about education, that
following Perón, there was an active attempt at reducing the quality of public schools.
Schooling, especially in the Peronist era, was tied directly to the symbolism of the worker. The
rhetoric surrounding the expansion of public schools, and vocational training, was “deliberately
constructed” to include “positive representations of manual work, [and] the worker.”169 This
was enacted through hiring policies favorable to Perón appointees – “A great number of
educators denounced the interference of the government in the hiring of teachers, favouring
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Peron’s followers, while discriminating against presumed or real opponents,”170 – and in the
construction of curriculum to favor Argentine identity and Peronism – “Since the end of the
nineteenth century to 1940, two objectives were salient in the rulings related to textbooks: to
guarantee the universal provision of books for all of the school population, and to control the
contents of the textbooks that were to be used in schools.”171 Following the Peronist period
“the succeeding governments brought the political centrality of the worker to an end and
repressed all symbology related to him. In the following years, the vocational education system
created during the Peronist era gradually fell apart.”172 The intentional dismantling of the public
education system, and the increasing rise of educational privatization, is directly related to
eroding stocks of human capital which was detrimental to Argentina’s long term development.
It should be noted that both of these effects came about in direct spite of Peronism – and as
such cannot be used as evidence against the Peronist model.
Moving on from initial conditions, I would now like to focus on the role of exports in
both models. In the previous section I laid out Rodrik’s critique of the Miracle Report’s
favoritism of an export led growth explanation. But for a moment let’s consider that exports
were the key factor in the miraculous growth experienced by HPAEs. How did nations achieve
industries which were capable of being immediately competitive on the world market? One
argument is that nations specialized in exports for which they had a comparative advantage,
namely labor intensive agriculture. By actively choosing to move away from agricultural
production, Perón pursued an industrial policy counter to Argentina’s ‘natural’ industry. This
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ignores the argument presented at the end of my second chapter, that agricultural exports
were not viable due to market interference and political pressure from the United States. In
contrast to Argentina, the HPAEs were being heavily supported by the United State up through
the 1960s. In an effort to fight Communism in the region, the U.S. actively pursued policies to
integrate the HPAEs into the global capitalist economy. Additionally, the HPAEs benefited from
a variety of ‘rebuilding’ projects after the close of numerous wars in the region. This was not
the case in Argentina.
Another explanation for the development of competitive industry can be found in Japan.
While the Miracle Report makes the case that openness to foreign goods made industry more
competitive, evidence from Japan suggests this is untrue. As mentioned above, by the metric
used in the report, Argentina was actually more open than a number of HPAEs – including
Japan. In fact, Japan actively pursued protectionist policies to grow their infant industries
before exposing them to global competition. Rodrik notes that “An authoritative study on
Japan’s innovation system concludes that import restrictions were the most significant and
helpful industrial policy as regards R&D effort.”173 Ogagiri and Goto identify protectionism as a
key factor in the development of Japan’s automobile industry.
The restriction on imports and foreign direct investment into Japan was probably the
most important policy until the early 1970s (as regards innovation). Restricting the
growing Japanese market, already the second largest in the capitalist economy in the
late 1960s, to Japanese firms who were competing intensively among themselves gave a
strong incentive to invest in plants, equipment, and R&D. In addition, because postwar
Japan’s Peace Constitution meant that the military was no longer a significant customer
to businesses, industries such as automobiles, which had been helped by military
procurement before the war but was still in its infancy relative to American and
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European producers, might have been wiped out were the market made open to foreign
competition.174
This directly calls into question the criticism of Perón’s protectionist strategies, and makes the
case that Japan had to follow ISI until ESI was a viable option – which was only after infant
industry had been sufficiently grown.
It is also unclear if exports were even the impetus needed to jumpstart the HPAEs.
Rodrik argues, in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, that “since export/GDP ratios were
exceptionally low in both countries early on - below 5 percent in South Korea in 1960 and
barely above 10 percent in Taiwan - it is difficult to imagine how exports could account for the
takeoff that these economies experienced in the early 1960s.”175 Instead, both countries
needed “a coherent investment strategy put [into] place by their governments.”176
Finally (on exports), while it remains ambiguous as to the positive growth effects of
openness to trade, there is a much clearer connection between growth and exchange rate
manipulation. As discussed in the second chapter of this project, exchange rate manipulation
was a key aspect of Peronist trade policy. This resulted in an overvaluation of goods, which
decreased their demand on the world market. Rodrik writes that “it is primarily exchange-rate
mismanagement that appears to be harmful to growth,” and “is that overvalued exchange rates
are detrimental to long-run economic performance.”177 It is clear that the Peronist government
failed to manage exchange rates, and this is a significant criticism of the model.
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Moving past exports, my final point of comparison is in terms of government corruption
and overall efficiency. Common criticisms of Perón, as laid out in the introduction and second
chapter, include a discussion of his government’s corruption. Nepotism, despotism, and
inefficiency are all terms thrown at the regime. In contrast, the HPAEs are hailed as exemplars
of openness, fairness, and incorruptibility. The argument goes that if Perón hadn’t been corrupt
then his government would have been more efficient in dealing with economic hardship. There
is evidence that democracy is good for growth. Amartya Sen points out that no democracy in
the 20th century has experienced a famine, and Rodrik notes that “democratic societies tend to
be better at dealing with the consequences of external shocks.”178 This is reinforced by
evidence in OPEC countries in the 1970s and 80s.
Systematic evidence from an earlier period of external turbulence - the late 1970s and
early 1980s - confirms the importance of democracy in fostering economic adjustment.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, countries with closed political systems and
autonomous executives proved worse at managing the consequences of the oil shocks
of the 1970s than countries in which non-elites had access to political institutions.179
This seems to be a clear difference between HPAEs and Argentina, and a clear indictment of
Perón. However, the idea that HPAEs were “incorruptible bureaucracies”180 is largely a myth.
Rodrik argues that “corruption has figured prominently as a key issue in recent election
campaigns in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan alike. The Economist has recently called Taiwan ‘a
country where corruption scandals are a dime a dozen.’.”181 As such, the connection between
growth and democracy is more complicated. Rodrik provides one reason as to why corruption
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in HPAEs had different results. He argues, “One qualitative difference seems to be that
corruption in HPAEs has been limited to the very top echelons of the bureaucracy, while in
many other developing countries it runs all the way down to the lowest ranks.”182 The
argument goes that when corruption is concentrated in the upper echelons of power, as
opposed to being present at all levels, it is easier and more cost effective to engage in bribery.
In other words, bribing one chief official is much easier than bribing a host of intermediaries.
Thus it is more cost effective to invest in corrupt HPAEs (where corruption is concentrated),
then in Latin American nations (where corruption is more spread out). It remains unclear
however if the Peronist government was more diffusively corrupt, or what effect the
perception of corruption (as a result of deliberate propaganda campaigns by the United States)
as opposed to actual corruption has on investment climates.

Chapter 3: Conclusion
Comparisons between the AM model and the Peronist model are both relevant and
elucidating. Both models are concerned with the same fundamental problem – how to develop
– and yet have achieved radically different results. While traditional comparisons focus on a
perceived diametric opposition between ISI and ESI, there is far more to the story. By
challenging traditional assumptions about the AM model, I have tried to provide a more
meaningful analysis of Peronism. The findings of this chapter are as follows: initial conditions in
terms of income and education were radically different between the HPAEs and Argentina, as
such Argentina was unprepared to follow the AM model. The categorization of HPAEs as purely
ESI runs contrary to the experience of Japan, and is not sufficient in discrediting Perón’s pursuit
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of ISI. Finally, perceptions of Argentina and the HPAEs are more myth than fact in terms of
government corruption. The most important conclusion we can draw is that context matters; it
isn’t as simple as saying, here is a successful set of policies follow them and you will achieve
growth. The real story is much more complex, and requires further analysis.
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Conclusion
At the beginning of this project I set out to examine one of economics great ‘mysteries’,
the so called Argentina paradox. Instead of trying to answer “What caused the Argentine
Paradox?” I choose to address “Was Perón responsible for Argentina’s economic regression?” In
this way I focused in on a more testable claim. In the first chapter of this project I laid out the
historical factors leading up to the election of Juan Domingo Perón. In the second chapter I
interrogated his model through four intermediary questions. In the third chapter I compared
the Peronist Model with the Asian Miracle Model, in an attempt to better understand the
effects of Peronism.
The key findings of this project are as follows. First, Juan Domingo Perón did construct a
unique and coherent economic model. This model was based on the contemporaneous
economic literature – including the works of Raul Prebisch – and was in direct response to both
shifting terms of trade and political pressure being placed on Argentina via the United States.
The Peronist model had a number of successes, mostly revolving around raising standards of
living and incorporating the working class into politics and the economy more effectively.
However, it also had a number of failures – most notable of which are corruption and poor
exchange rate management. Perón is often criticized for pursuing Import substitution
Industrialization, however it is clear after comparing Argentina to HPAEs that export
substitution industrialization was not an option open to Argentina – nor is it the silver bullet
that some scholars contend. The most important finding of this project is that context matters;
Argentina and Peronism cannot be understood in a vacuum, but rather on their own terms in

Gansley-Ortiz 69

their distinct historical realities. Given this, I find that Peronism cannot be solely to blame for
the Argentine paradox. Alas, we must continue searching for a more sufficient explanation to
one of the world’s great economic mysteries.
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